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IN THE SUPREME. COURT
of the

S'TATE OFUTAH
W. N. PREAS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
RAY PHEBUS, PAUL STOCK, JOE
T. JUHAN, WEBER OIL COMpANY, a Colorado Corporation,
EQUITY OIL COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
8104

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
(All italics, unless otherwise noted, have been added
by Appellant).
Pleadings and Judicial Proceedings

This action was initially commenced by complaint
filed by appellant in the District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District on May 16, 1950 (R. 1). The case was
thereafter removed to the Federal District Court of the
District of Utah, the motion of appellant to remand
denied, and the case was tried before the Federal Court
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without a jury on March 12 1951. Thereafter appeal was
taken to the United States 'court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit which court remanded the cause to the Utah District
' for further proceedings. Preas v. Phebus, 195 F.
Court
(2d) 61 (C.C.A. 10).
After the case was remanded to the State Court,
the appellant filed an amended complaint (R. 12 to 28).
The original complaint was in substance that of a typical
quiet title action, and the amended complaint which
formed the basis of the present trial (R. 12 to 28)
retained the substance of the original complaint but
broadened the issues to include other foundations of
recovery. The complaint alleges that appellant W. N.
Preas is the owner of a one-third of 1% oil royalty in and
to 440 acres of land located on the Ashley Yalley structure in Uintah County, Utah, that respondents wrongfully claim they are the owners of the same, and that
they liave refused to pay to appellant the royalties to
which he is entitled following the discovery of oil on
such lands in 1948. The prayer of the complaint seeks a
decree to remove the cloud and quiet title in respondent,
and in the alternative that certain conveyances of record
be declared void and respondents Ray Phebus and Paul
Stock compelled to execute a conveyance of such interest
to appellant, or that the court decree that respondents
hold the royalty interest in trust for the use and benefit
of appellant, and finally for an accounting of the proceeds due appellant from the sale of oil which had been
produced from said land.
Respondent Ray Phebus filed an answer disclaiming

2
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any interest in the royalty involved (R. 4, 5 ). The remaining respondents filed an answer denying the right of
recovery and pleading a number of affirmative defenses
including liinitations, failure of appellant to demand a
reconveyance of his royalty interest, accord and satisfaction, estoppel and laches. Many of the facts are
admitted by the pleadings and will be detailed hereafter.
The case was tried before the District Court at
Provo, Utah, on June 1, 1953, and a memorandum decision filed on July 30, 1953 (R. 35), awarding judgment
to respondents no cause of action. Findings, conclusions
and decree were thereafter filed on September 3, 1953
(R. 38 to 44).
Facts
On February 23, 1925, appellant, W. N. Preas,
acquired by grant from M. P. Smith and Ellen M. Smith,
his wife, in perpetuity, a royalty interest of 1% of the
oil and gas in and upon 480 acres of land located in Township 5 South Range 22 East Salt Lake lVIeridian (Exhibit A), which was duly recorded.
Thereafter on October 11, 1930, Lucius A. Dick,
James Wash Sheridan, J. N. Wyman, Ida H. Sheridan,
Francis llamilton Sheridan, N. J. Meagher and W. N.
Preas, Appellant herein, as owners of oil and gas royalty
interests in and to 440 acres of the lands described in
Exhibit 1, executed an agreement with respondents Paul
Stock and Ray Phebus (Exhibit C), which was duly
recorded. As this agreement is in one respect the focal
point of the controversy herein, the same is set forth in
full, excluding only the signatures:

3
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(Typographical errors are those of the exhibit.)
"Entry No. 8378
ASSIGN~1:ENT ROYALTY INTEREST
This agreement and assignment made this 11th
day of October 1930 between the undersigned
owners, partie parties of the first part, and Paul
Stock of Cody, Wyoming and Ray Phebus of
Thermopolis, Wyoming parties of the second part,

WITNESSETH
Whereas the parties of the first part are the
owners of certain royalties in the gas now being
produced and that may hereafter be produced
from the following described lands situated in the
County of Uintah, State of Utah, to-wit:- .
South East quarter (SE14), of Southeast
quarter ( SE14) of Section fifteen (15) East half
E¥2) of Northeast quarter (NE14) and the Northeast quarter ( NE14) of the Southeast quarter
(SE14) of Section twenty two (22) Northwest
quarter (NW14) of the Northwaet quarter (NW14) ; South half ( S¥2) of Northwest quarter
( NW14) ; Southwest quarter ( SW14) of Northeast quarter (NE14); North half (N¥2) of Southwest quarter ( SW14) and the Northwest quarter
(NW14) of the Southeast quarter (SE14) of Section twenty three (23) Township Five (5) South,
Range Twenty two (22) East;
and whereas said parties of the first part are also
the owners of certain royalties in the oil whish
may be hereinafter be produced and saved from
said land; AND WHEREAS the parties of the
second part are the owners of certain Interests
in the Oil and Gas that may be produced from
said land and are desirious of negotai ting with
a responsible oil production Company for the
4
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drilling of a deep test well on said ground, but
cannot perfect said negotiations due to the fact
that there are now outstanding royalties of eighteen and one-half (18¥2) persent which it is
desirable to reduce to a total Royalty of twelve
and one half (12¥2) percent; AND WHEREAS
such drilling well not only test such land for oil,
but offers the posibility of further developing the
gas production from said land to the benefit of the
holders of said gas royalties.
NOW THEREFOR: in consideration of the premise~ of procuring the drilling od a deep test well
on said land, for the consideration of One Dollar
($1.00) and other valuable considerations the
undersigned parties of the first part, being the
owners of the respective royalties interests as
hereinafter set opposite their respective signatures, do hereby sell, assign and set over unto the
parties of the second part One third Va of their
respectice royalty interests in the oil produced
and saved from said land.
IT IS EXPRESSTY UNDERSTOOD AND
AGREEDThat this assignment does not apply to
the royalty interests of said parties of the first
part in gas produced from said land. This assignment is made for the purpose of procuring the
drill.ing of a well to test the said land for oil under
the agreement between the said Paul Stock and
Ray Phebus on the one part and the Standard oil
company of California andjor one of its subsidiaries, on the other part, hereinafter designated
as the operating Company. If the negotiations of
the said Paul Stock and Ray phebus shall result
in the drilling, within the limitations hereinafter
provided of a test well upon the Ashley Valley
Structure to the depth of the pennsylvanain formation or to such lesser debth as shall produce Oil

5
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in commercial quantities, then this assi.gnrnent
shall be at full force and effect as to the o~l royalties hereinafter set forth. It is understood that
the limitations above reffered to are as follows,
the said operation company is to commence said
well on the Ashley Valley structure within six
months after the completion of the deep test well
whoch shall first be drilled on the Rangley structure in Northwestern Colorado, said well on the
Rangley structure shall be commences as soon
hereafter as weather conditions will permit and
not later than the summer of 1931, after the commencement if each of the said wells, the drilling
operations shall be presented with reasonable diligence. If said test well upon the Ashley Valley
structure shall not be drilled as herein contemplated, then in that event the parties of the second
part hereby agree to reconvey the royalty interests herein assigned to them to the respective parties of the first part. In Witness whereof we have
hereunto set our hands and set opposite our respective names the presentage of royalty interest
affected by this agreement and have caused this
assignment of One third ~ thereof to be executed.
NAME
Royalty
Lusius A Dick
%%
James Wash Sheridan
1%
J. N. Wyman
%%
Ida H. Sheridan
%%
Francis Hamilton Sheridan.
1%
Mayme Wyman
N. J. Meagher
2%
W. N. Preas
1%
parties of the first part;
Ray Phebus
Paul Stock
parties of the second part; "
6
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Since the Clerk has numbered all of the Transcript
of Proceedings as page 45 of the Record, we shall refer
hereafter to pages of such Transcript with the letter "'T".
With reference to Exhibit C, it was stipulated by the
parties that a well was drilled on the Rangely Structure
in Northwestern Colorado by Standard Oil Company of
California or one of its subsidiaries, and that such well
was spudded in on 1Iay 19, 1931 and completed on July
31, 1933, at a depth of 7,155 feet. This well was the deep
test well on the Rangley Structure referred to in Exhibit
C (T. 10). It was likewise stipulated (T. 10) that neither
the Standard Oil Company of California, its wholly
owned subsidiary the California Company, nor any other
subsidiary of Standard Oil Company of California referred to in Exhibit C, commenced a well within six
months after the completion of the test well on the Rangley Structure on July 31, 1933, nor at any other time
drilled any oil or gas well upon the 440 acres of land
described in Exhibit C. The conditions precedent to the
effective assignment set forth in exhibit 0 were never
performed.
Subsequent to the execution of Exhibit C and on
April 30, 1931, Ray Phebus and Paul Stock entered into
a contract with Standard Oil Company of California with
reference to drilling operations on said land (Exhibit D).
On ·November 30, 1931 Paul Sto~k and Ray Phebus
assigned to Standard Oil Company of California such oil
royalties as they had acquired, among other royalties,
under the assignment of October 11, 1930, set forth above
as Exhibit C (Exhibit F). On December 31, 1931 the

7
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Standard Oil Company of California assigned its rights
acquired under the grants to it from Phebus and Stock
of April 30, 1931 and November 30, 1931 to its wholly
owned subsidiary the California Company (Exhibit G).
On March 21, 1934, the California Company assigned
back to Ray Phebus and Paul Stock all of its oil and gas
rights acquired in the property reciting that it had
elected not to commence the drilling of a test well on the
Ashley Valley Structure (Exhibit H).
There are in the record a number of exhibits affecting title to the property and the oil and gas rights located
in and upon the same, dated subsequent to the reconveyance to Phebus and Stock of the California Company. On
January 19, 1945 Ray Phebus and Ella Phebus, his wife,
quit claimed to respondent Joe T. Juhan, all of their
right, title and interest in and to said lands (R. 15). On
April 14, 1945, Paul Stock quit claimed his interest in
said lands to Charles S. Hill (R. 15). On January 5,
1946, Charles S. Hill and Virginia W. Hill, his wife, quit
claimed their interest in said lands to Joe T. Juhan (R.
15). On July 12, 1948, Joe T. Juhan and Genevieve
Juhan, his wife, quit claimed to Paul Stock an undivided
1;4 interest in said lands (R. 15). On January 11, 1946,
Joe T. Juhan and Genevieve Juhan, his wife, quit claimed
to respondent Equity Oil Company an undivided % of
their interest in said lands (R. 15). On December 30,
1947, Equity Oil Company quit claimed to Weber Oil
Company all of its right, title and interest in and to said
lands (R. 16).
On December 30, 1948, respondents Equity Oil Com-

8
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pany and Weber Oil Company, Joe T. Juhan and Paul
Stock n1ade and entered into an operating agreement
wherein Weber Oil Cmnpany, Joe T. Juhan and Paul
Stock were designated as non-operators, and Equity Oil
Company was designated as operator. Under the terms
of this agreement, the 440 acres of land here involved
were to be drilled, developed and operated for the purpose of exploring, developing and removing oil and gas
therein contained, and Equity Oil Company was given
certain liens upon the oil and gas derived from said lands
as protection for their expenditures, and as such operators likewise were charged with and did distribute
royalty payments to the various royalty owners (Exhibit
I, to which is attached the accounting procedures to be
followed).
All of these various agreen1ents and deeds were duly
recorded in the Office of the County Recorder of Uintah
County at Vernal, Utah.
The signature of appellant on Exhibit C was notarized on October 17, 1930 (T. 14). Appellant did not
prepare or request preparation of the agreement, and so
far as he can recall he had not actually seen it prior to
the date on which it was executed (T.14).
Exhibit C states that "In consideration of the premises of procuring the drilling of a deep test well on said
land for the consideration of $1.00 and other valuable
consideration ..... " Appellant tendered proof that he
did not receive the $1.00 referred to in Exhibit C, which
tender was rejected by the Court (T. 16).
The property involved in this action lies approximately.
9
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8 to 8¥2 miles away from Vernal (T. 31). At the ti1ne of
execution of Exhibit C in 1930 appellant was in the sheep
business (T. 13), and spent a generous portion of his
time in various states buying and selling such livestock.
In 1943 Joe T. Juhan was engaged in salvaging pipe
near the property in question which had been used to
place gas in the town of Vernal ( T. 55), of which appellant was aware. In 1946 appellant was present for a part
of one day at the Vernal Court House where the trial of
Meagher v. Uintah Gas Comparny arnd Valley Fuel Supply, 185 P. (2d) 747, was in progress (T. 82). He testified that this case did not involve any problems with
reference to the oil royalty which is the subject of present litigation (T. 68).
In July of 1948 appellant saw a bulldozer working on
the property, and was advised by a workman that he
thought that an oil well was going to be erected (T. 28).
This was the first time that appellant had any knowledge
or information whatsoever that anyone was drilling or
proposing to drill an oil well on the property here involved ( T. 28). His first knowledge that a well was
actually being drilled for oil was in July 1948 when he
saw a rig going up (T. 27 and 28) but he had no idea as
to who was drilling or proposing to drill such an oil well.
Equity Oil Company, the operator under Exhibit I, which
was the agreement actually dated December 30, 1948,
between itself, Weber Oil Company and Juhan and Stock,
spudded in a well on the property on August 1 1948
'
'
which was completed as a producing well on September
18, 1948 (T. 75).
10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

About noon of November 18, 1948, appellant receive<i
a check from the Equity Oil Company (Exhibit K), which
contained an endorsement, from which he gathered for
the first tim~ that there was some question as to whether
or not there was an adverse claim to his :Y3 of 1% oil
royalty
18). So far as he knew this was the first
information from any source tha.t there was such an
adverse claim on the part of respondents or their predecessors in interest in existence subsequent to 1933 (T.
17). On that sa~ne afternoon he attempted to call Mr.
Paul Stock at Cody, Wyoming (T. 18) where he was
advised that Stock was at the Brown Palace Hotel at
Denver, Colorado C-r. 18). He reached him later that
afternoon, advised him that he had received the first
royalty check and asked him what was meant by the
endorsement referring to the 113 of 1%. Stock then
advised appellant that the Stock and Phebus agreement
was a long tin1e ago and that he didn't recall the particulars but would look into it and advise appellant (T. 18).
Shortly thereafter appellant contacted J. L. Dougan,
President of the Equity Oil Company, when he again
asked about the 1;3 of 1% royalty, and was advised that
the only thing Dougan could do would be follow the
advice of his attorney, and that if Paul Stock executed
a reconveyance he would be glad to make payment for
the royalty on the 1;3 of 1% (T. 22). Appellant continued
his efforts to reach Stock, who shortly after Christmas
of 1948 had gone to the Hawaiian Islands ( T. 23). In
March of. 1949 he talked to Stock and arranged a meeting
at Salt Lake City with him (T. 24) for the following day.

cr.

11
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Stock was not present for such meeting (T. 24), and
appellant was not able to see him prior to the commencement of the initial action, notwithstanding a determined
effort to do so (T. 25 and 26).
Prior to November 1948, appellant had not requested
reassignment of the 1fa of 1 o/o royalty from any of the
respondents herein, as he was very sure they had no
interest in his full 1% royalty (T. 48). On April 12,
1949, acting upon the advice of counsel, appellant wrote
a letter to Paul Stock at Cody, Wyoming, wherein he
stated that Mr. Phebus, ~1:r. Dougan and :Mr. Julian had
all assured him they were willing to reconvey, and also
that Phebus stated he thought this had been done a long
time ago. In this letter he also mentioned the possible
necessity of a law suit and requested Stock to execute
an assignment which was enclosed, and which the letter
stated would constitute a purchase on his part of Ya of
1% (Exhibit 2, T. 50). Enclosed with this letter was a
post office money order for $10.00 (T. 51). Because of
his previous experience with the Bank of Vernal, he was
under the impression that any such document required
a monetary consideration for its validity (T. 60). At this
time appellant had received monthly royalty checks from
Equity Oil Company based upon % of 1% of royalty
(there has never been any dispute as to his ownership
of this fractional interest) for a period of five months
(T. 59), totaling $319.53 (Exhibit J), and he entertained
no thought whatsoever that the $10.00 payment was in
any way to represent the value of the royalty or an actual
purchase of any royalty interest (T. 60, 61).
12
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On Decen1ber 29, 1927, W. N. Preas and Ella L.
Preas, his wife, executed a quit claim deed to said land
toN. J. Meagher of Vernal, Utah (Exhibit B). When it
appeared that through inadvertance this had included
the royalty interest of appellant, on November 28, 1931,
N. J. Meagher and appellant executed an agreement and
assignment stating that said quit claim deed was not
intended to and did not transfer the royalty interest, and
forinally quit claiming such interest back to appellant
(R. 13). Later on, on April 28, 1948, N.J. Meagher prepared and executed an identical instrument (Exhibit I).
The only witness who appeared in behalf of respondents was Joe T .•Juhan (T. 75). He stated that in April,
1948, he had held a conversation with appellant at Vernal
and advised him that a well was going to be drilled and
that appellant should get a deed from Meagher for his
royalty, and that he didn't think Meagher would ever
give him a deed (T. 77). He went on to testify that notwithstanding the fact that he had seen appellant a number of times subsequent to 1943, he had never discussed
the agreement between appellant and Phebus and Stock
(Exhibit C) with him (T. 88). Further, he had examined
the records in Uintah County in 1943, and had seen a
copy of this agreeinent, and that he knew at that time that
no well had been drilled on the Ashley Valley Structure
lands here involved (T. 83, 85 and 86). When asked why
it was that he felt appellant had no interest in the oil
royalty he stated (T. 88): "Because I had seen a document of record someplace where he had assigned it to
Meagher, but I never found where Meagher had assigned

13
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it back to him." Later, he changed this statement to
include the Phebus and Stock agreement (R. 91).
At the time of drilling the well, Juhan testified that
he had relied upon the record title and the Supreme
Court decision (T. 80), which decision was Meagher v.
Uintak Gas Compwny and Valley Fuel Supply, 185 P.
(2d) 747 (T. 82). He continued that he understood that
this decision was relative to a modification agreement,
and didn't know whether or not it involved the Phebus
and Stock agreement ( T. 89). In fact, there was no issue
nor reference in this case to such agreement. When asked
whether the well would have been drilled, Juhan replied
that they probably would not have drilled with an outstanding royalty of 18;6% (T. 90).
The issue in this case involves only one third of the
1% royalty received by appellant from M. P. Smith
(Exhibit A). F'ollowing the issue of the initial royalty
check on November 17, 1948 by Equity Oil Company,
based upon two-thirds of the 1% interest, which check
was the first notice appellant had that the respondents
claimed any interest in the one third interest, respondent
Equity Oil Company continued to forward such checks
each month thereafter. A sun1n1ary of these checks is
contained in Exhibit J, and fifty percent of the total
amount would equal the value of the one-third of 1%
royalty payments, or $9,284.88, as appellant does not
question the accounting accuracy of this Exhibit. Appellant has not cashed, pledged, or in any way used these
checks because of the endorsement placed thereon by
Equity Oil Company, notwithstanding the fact that there
14
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has never been the slightest question as to his right to
receive the arnounts of these checks which represent proceeds of the remaining % of 1% royalty. The endorsement reads as follows:·
'"Payment in full oil produced and sold during October 1948 Ashley Valley No. 1 well under
Modification Agreement dated May 21, 1927;
royalty interest 1% from M. P. Smith February
3, 1925, less assignment V3 of 1% to Paul Stock
and Ray Phebus October 11, 1930; and the payee,
by endorsernent of check attached, represents that
he is the holder and owner of the royalty interest
in the amount stated."
STATEJ\IENT OF POINTS
Appellant relies upon the following points:
POINT I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, FOR
THE REASON THAT THE SAME ARE CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE AND STIPULATED FACTS, AND AGAINST
LAW.
POINT II. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS AND AGAINST APPELLANT, NO CAUSE OF
ACTION, FOR THE REASON THAT SAID JUDGMENT IS
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND STIPULATED
FACTS, AND AGAINST LAW.
POINT III. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
MAKING AND ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT, THE
SAME BEING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND STIPULATED FACTS.
POINT IV. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
REFUSING APPELLANT'S TENDER OF PROOF THAT
APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE $1.00, WITH REFERENCE
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TO THE EXECUTION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
APPELLANT AND PHEBUS AND STOCK, FROM WHICH
ANY RIGHT OF RESPONDENTS MUST ORIGIN ATE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, FOR
THE REASON THAT THE SAME ARE CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE AND STIPULATED FACTS, AND AGAINST
LAW.
POINT II. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS AND AGAINST APPELLANT, NO CAUSE OF
ACTION, FOR THE REASON THAT SAID JUDGMENT IS
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND STIPULATED
FACTS, AND AGAINST LAW.

Both of the first two points are concerned with the
fact that the Trial Court failed to properly construe the
basic agreement between appellant and Phebus and
Stock, under which no right vested until there had been
a performance of the condition set forth, and which contemplated the drilling of a well upon the lands in question
by Standard Oil Company, or its subsidiary, within the
time limits indicated. For this reason these points will
be considered together under the following headings.
A.

An oil royalty is an interest in real property.

The case is essentially a quiet title action to remove
a cloud evidenced by Exhibit C. In determining the
nature and effect of this agreement, it is necessary to
establish the nature of the royalty interest with which
such instrument is concerned, i.e., whether that royalty
is real property or personalty. This question, so far as
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appellant can determine, is of first impression in Utah.
Appellant's position is that the royalty here involved is
real property.
As the discovery of oil in other states produced litigation in the field of oil and gas law, there was an early
confusion in the cases fron1 such jurisdictions on this
question. This arose principally because of the migratory nature of oil beneath the land surface, which distinguished it frmn other minerals. In the early stages of
the legal development in the various states concerned
with oil rights, the courts reached the conclusion that
interests in oil and gas, whether royalty or otherwise, are
interests in real property. This is the position of all
states today in which the question has arisen, although
there is a variance as to the precise nature of that real
property interest. See annotations: Oil and Gas Royalty
as Real or Personal Property, 90 A.L.R. 770; 101 A.L.R.
884; 131 A.L.R. 1371.
In Tennant v. Dunn, 110 S.W. (2d) 53, the Texas
view is summarized as follows:
"vVhile there was, prior to the decision of
Sheffield v. Hogg, 124 Tex. 290, 77 S.W. (2d)
1021, 1024, 80 S.W. (2d) 741, confusion in the
opinions of the courts of this state as to the nature
of royalty interests, it is settled by that decision
that royalties, whether payable in money or in
kind, issuing out of the ordinary oil and gas
leasehold estate, a determinable fee, 'are interests
in land; and hence not subject to parol sale, but
have the protection of the statute of frauds, the
statutes regulating conveyances and mortgages of
real estate, and the statutes requiring the record
17
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of instruments affecting title to or liens on 1an d'"
·
"The gist of the opinion in Sheffield v. Ho~g
is that oil and gas royalties, whether payable 1n
kind or in rnoney, and whether arising from the
ordinary lease of land in which the lessor owns
the minerals or from a lease made under the
' Act should be adjudged to be
Relinquishment
present interests in iand rather than mere rights
in personalty at some uncertain date, because they
are profits arising out of land, and, further, because such classification, which accords with the
practice in the oil and gas industry, furnishes a
stability highly important, if not essential to the
structure of that business. For the same reasons,
the right created by the assignment to ~irs. Dunn
should be classified as an interest in land."
Sheffield v. Hogg, 77 S.W. (2d) 1021, 1024, 80 S.W.
(2d) 741, indicates a practical reason why oil and gas
royalties should be treated as real property:
"The oil industry in Texas is largely dependent for development, growth, or prosperity, on
the doctrine that the interests we are considering
-such as the Lessee's and the Lessor's estates
under contracts which are in customary use in
Texas-are interests in land; and hence not subject to parol sale, but have the protection of the
statute of frauds, the statutes regulating conveyances and mortgages of real estate, and the
statutes requiring the record of instruments affecting title to or liens on land, so that purchasers
can rely on deed and lien records and can execute
and receive transfers and conveyances in reliance
on true abstracts of title and lawyers' correct
opinions thereon. Were the stabliity furnished by
these rules withdrawn and the fundamental contracts, on which the oil business so largely rests,
18
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be adjudged hy the Supreme Court to create
mere rights in personalty at some uncertain date
in the future, the structure of the business would
be seriously, if not fatally, jeopardized."
The decision in Callahan v. Ma,rtin, 43 P. (2d) 788,
(Calif.), likewise holds that royalty interests are real
property, but upon a different premise than the Texas
view. rl,hus at page 791:
"Some jurisdictions adhere to the theory that
the owner of land has as estate in oil and gas
beneath the surface in like manner as he has an
estate in the surface; that oil and gas in place
beneath the surface of land constitute a part of
the land, and as such are real property, may be
granted separate and apart from the surface, and
when so granted vest in the assignee an estate in
definite corporeal real property. This theory cannot be better enlarged upon than by the following
quotation from Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex.
226, 176 S.W. 717, 719, 720, L.R.A. 1917F, 989:
" 'It is no longer doubted that oil and gas
within the ground are minerals. They have peculiar attributes not common to other minerals because of their fugitive nature or vagrant habitthe disposition to wonder or percolate, and the
possibility of their escape from beneath one part
of the surface of the earth to another. N evertheless, they are to be classed as minerals. (Citing
authorities) In place, they lie within the strata
of the earth, and necessarily are a part of the
realty. Being a part of the realty while in place,
it would seem to logically follow that, whenever
they are conveyed while in that condition or possessing that status, a conveyance of an interest in
the realty results. It is generally conceded that,
for the purpose of ownership and conveyance of
19
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solid 1ninerals the earth may be divided horizontally as well ~s vertically, and that title to the
surface n1ay rest in one person and title t~ the
strata beneath the surface containing such minerals in another. * * *
"'If they are in place beneath the tract, t~~y
are essentially a part of the realty, and the1r
grant, therefore, while in that condition, if effectual at all, is a grant of an interest in the realty.
* * * Their conveyance while in place, if the instrument be given any effect, is consequently the
conveyance of an interest in the realty.' See, also,
Stephens v. l\fid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex.
160, 254 S.W. 290, 29 A.L.R. 566, note, 585;
Leonard v. Prater (Tex. C01n. App.) 36 S.W. (2d)
2161 86 A.L.R. 499, note, 506."
The decision's reasoning turns to the early common
law for analogy, and concludes that an oil royalty is a
profit a prendre, and an estate in realty. At page 793,
it states:
"* * *Of the ancient incorporeal hereditaments listed by Blackstone, several either are not
recognized at all in this country, or, if they do
not involve rights in or to land, are not classed as
things real. But a number of the common-law
incorporeal hereditaments which involve rights
connected with or pertaining to land persist, and
are recognized generally as a species of interest
in land, or estate in real property. (Citing authorities.)
"The incorporeal hereditament of common is
defined by Blackstone as' being a profit which
a man hath in the land of another; as to feed his'
beasts, to catch fish, to dig turf, to cut wood or
the like.' Cooley's Blackstone, supra, p. 455. These
20
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are the rights which are described a.s profits a
pendre, and they may be several as well as in common. See, discussion, 2 Tiffany, Real Property,
1394."
"Jurists writing since Blackstone's time have
remarked that his inclusion of incorporeal hereditaments, together with lands and tenements, as
"things, or objects in which don1inion or property
may be had, is somewhat misleading. See 1 Tiffany, Real Property (2d Ed.) p. 9, note 27, citing
Austin, Jurisprudence (3d Ed.) 371, 804; Digby,
History Real Property (4th Ed.) 304, note; Hohfeld, 23 Yale Law Journal, p. 23; Salmond, Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) 220. Where the incorporeal
hereditmnent relates or pertains to land, it is,
rather, a designation of a certain class of rights
in and to land, just as an estate in fee simple
absolute is the designation applied to the rights
and interests of the person who has the fullest
and most absolute estate in lands known to the
law. That rights in and to land, though they are
embraced within the definition of an incorporeal
hereditament, constitute a limited interest or
estate in land, is generally recognized. (See cases
cited second paragraph above.) Where this
limited interest is to endure in perpetuity or for
life, it is a freehold interest, and real property or
real estate, as well as an estate in real property."
Again at page 795 :
"The royalty return which the lessee renders
to his lessor for this estate in the land is rent, or
so closely analogous to rent as to partake of the
incidents thereof. In the lease in the instant case,
executed by Gonzales through his guardian, tihe
lessor's oil royalty is referred to as 'rent or
royalty.' In discussing the nature of landowner's
21
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royalties, the Supreme Court.of the United States
said in United States v. Noble, 237 U.S. 74, 35
S. Ct. 532, 535, 59 L. Ed. 844 :
" 'The rents and royalties were profit issuing
out of the land. When they accrued, they became
personal property; but rents and royalties to
acrue were a part of the estate remaining in the
lessor. As such, they would pas'S to his heirs, and
not to his personal representatives. * * *
" 'It is said that the leases contemplated the
payment of surns of money, equal to the agreed
percentage of the market value of the minerals,
and thus that the assignment was of these
moneys; but the fact that rent is to be paid in
money does not make it any the less a profit
issuing out of the land.' "
At page 796:

"* * * In this analysis, the assignee of an oil
royalty not limited to the duration of a particular
lease has a right in the nature of a profit a pendre
in the land, and this right costitutes an interest in
said land an estate in real property. * * *"
See also Pa;yne v. Callahan, 99 P. (2d) 1050, (Calif.).
In Arrington v. United Royalty, 65 S.W. (2d) 37:
"We have held that leases given for a definite period in which exploration and discovery of
the mineral might be made, to continue as long
thereafter as oil and gas is produced conveys not
merely a license but an interest and easement in
the land itself. Standard Oil Co. v. Oil Well Salvage Co., 170 Ark. 729, 281 S. W. 360; Clark v.
Dep.nis, 172 Ark. 1096, 291 S. W. 887; Henry v.
G~f Refining Co., 176 Ark. 133, 2 S.W. (2d) 687;
and Henry v. Gulf Refining Co., 179 Ark. 138, 15
22
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S.W. (2d) 979. As a consequence of this rule, our
court has held that an attempted conveyance of
the royalty reserved by parol is void, this, of
course, being on the theory that the royalty was
an interest in real estate."
See also Marias R,iver Syndicate v. Big West Oil Co.,
38 P. (2d) 599, (Mont.); Mark v. Bradford, 23 N.W. (2d)
205 (Mich.) .
B.

The Agreement (Exhibit C) between Appellant and
Phebus and Stock from which the one-third of one
per cent oil royalty in litigation must arise, terminated by its own terms in January, 1934, as the
condition on which the grant was to become effective, requiring Standard Oil Company, or one of
its subsidiaries, to drill a well on the property involved, was not pe1·formed.

Exhibit C is the basic instrument from which any
right or interest of respondents to the one-third of one
per cent oil royalty must arise. When Phebus and Stock
failed to perform the condition of such agreement and
to drill a well as contemplated, no right ever vested in
them so far as the one-third of one per cent royalty is
concerned, since the agreement contemplated that they
were to receive this royalty interest only if they performed the condition and drilled such well within the
time limitation set forth, and under the facts of this case,
such time expired in January, 1934, long prior to the
Equity Oil Company well in 1948.
This instrument recites that appellant, among others,
and Phebus and Stock were the owners of oil royalties
in the lands described therein, and that it was desired
to negotiate with a responsible oil production company
23
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for the drilling of a deep te·st well on said ground which
would not only test such land for oil, but would offer
the possibility of further developing the gas production
from the land to the benefit of the holders of gas royalties in it, as gas was then being produced. The recitals
also state that in order to perfect the drilling arrangements, it was desirable to reduce the outstanding oil
royalties.
These recitals are an indication of the intention
existing in the minds of the parties at the time this instrument was executed. The agreement was to have a limited
duration, not only because there was a desire to test for
oil, but because gas was then being produced from the
property and the parties desired to further develop the
gas production for the benefit of the holders of the gas
royalties. Certainly these gas royalty holders did not
contemplate an increase in production some eighteen
years later. In addition, there is a specific reference
to a responsible oil company, which is later affirmatively
identified as the Standard Oil Company of California,
or one of its subsidiaries. As appellant testified, there
had been a previous discovery of oil, although not in
commercial quantities (T. 34), and he knew that Standard Oil Company was financially able and experienced in
oil matters ( T. 26). In short, a specific drilling by this
particular company within a limited time was in the
minds of the parties.
Turning to the body of this instrument, there next
appears the consideration upon which the assignment of
tlie oil royalty interest was based:
24
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··NOW THEREFOR: in consideration of
the premises of procuring the drilling of a deep
test well on said land, for the consideration of
One Dollar ( $1.00) and other valuable considerations the undersigned parties of the first part, being the owners of the respective royalties interests as hereinafter set opposite their respective
signatures, do hereby sell, assign and set over
unto the parties of the second part One third Ya
of their respective royalty interests in the oil
produced and saved from said land."
This language, when considered in connection with
the balance of the agreernent, clearly shows that the consideTation for the execution of this agreement was nothing more or less than the drilling of an oil well. The fact
that there is a recital with reference to the payment of
$1.00 does not in any way change the real consideration,
and, in fact, the dollar is obviously purely nominal, as
it does not bear any reasonable relationship to the values
with which the instrument was concerned. Further, evidence relative to such intent of the parties is clear from
the fact that appellant never received such amount. Proof
of this fact was Inade by tender, (T. 16, 17), and the refusal of the Trial Court to accept such tender has elsewhere been assigned as error. A similar situation arose
in People's Gas Co. v. Dean, 193 F. 938, (C.C.A. 8, 1911).
In that case the Court pointed out that under a somewhat similar agreement the real and only consideration
was the drilling of a well. The reasoning of the opinion
is well set forth at page 942 a:s follows.
"When we come to examine the lease or contract under consideration, we think it perfectly
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clear that it was made for the purpose
expl~r
ing and developing the land for gas ~~ oll. Whil_e
the consideration was primarily $1, 1t 1s very evident from the terms of the contract that the prosp~ctive benefits and profits from gas and oil were
the real and vital considerations moving the contracting parties. As was said by the Supreme
Court of Indiana, in the case of Hancock v. Diamond Plate Glass Co., 37 Ind. App. 351, 75 N.E.
659:
" 'To the landowner the manifest inducement
was the rent and royalties he expected to enjoy
if the gas company should find gas or oil in paying quantities; to the gas company the right to exclude others from the preinises it should drill. It
will not do to believe that the landowner would for
the pittance of 50 cents per acre per annum have
knowingly incumbered his land, situate in the gas
district, and thereby reduced its selling value by
transferring, for an indefinite period, and for
speculative purposes, the right to enter at the
pleasure of the grantee or his assignee and mine
the underlying gas or oil, or that he would have
bargained away his prospects for large gains from
the gas and oil under his land, with the knowledge that the same would be extracted through
wells on other premises, and that his profits would
be limited to the annual acreage rent during the
process of extraction.'"
See:

Shelden v. Bright, 10 P. (2d) 831, (Kans.);
17 C.J.S. 475, Sec.128.

The balance of the instrument continues (typographical errors appear in exhibit).
26
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"IT IS EXPRESSTY UNDERSTOOD AND
AGREED That this assignment does not apply
to the royalty interests of said parties of th~ first
part in gas produced from said land. This assignment is made for the purpose of procuring
the drilling of a well to test the said land for oil
under the agree1nent between the said Paul Stock
and Ray Phebus on the one part and the Sta,ndard
oil company of California andjor one of its subsidiaries, on the other part, hereinafter designated
as the operating Company. If the negotiations of
the said Pa~tl Stock and Ray pheb1.ts shall result in
the drilling, withirn the limitations hereinafter provided of a test well upon the Ashley Valley Structure to the depth of th,e pennsylvanian formation
or to such lesser debth as shall produce oil in
commercial quantities, then this assignment shall
be at full force and effect a,s to the oil royalties
hereinafter set forth. It is understood that the
limitations above reffered to are as follows, the
said operation company is to commence said well
on the Ashley Valley structure within six months
after the completion of the deep test well whoch
shall first be drilled on the Rangley structure in
Northwestern Colorado, said well on the Rangley
structure shall be con1mences as soon hereafter
as weather conditions will permit and not later
than the summer of 1931. after the commencelnent if each of the said wells, the drilling operations shall be presented with reasonable diligence.
If said test well upon the Ashley Valley structure
shall not be drilled as herein contemplated, then in
that event the parties of the second part hereby
agree to reconv~y the royalty interests herein
assigned to them to the respective parties of the
first part. In Witness whereof we have hereunto
set our hands and set opposite our respective
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names the presentage of royalty interes~ affe~ted
by this agreement and have caused th1s assignment of One third lj3 thereof to be executed."
Again reference is made to the purpose of the agreement to procure a well "under the agreement between
the said Paul Stock and Ray Phebus on the one part and
the Standard Oil Company of California and/ or one of
its subsidiaries, on the other part". There was therefore
in existance an agreement with Standard Oil, and the
parties were not attempting to develop the property with
any oil company which would drill, or in a general way,
but under a specific agreement which required only for
final completion of the reduction of royalties outstanding
from 18lj2 % to 12¥2%. The agree1nent then provides
that IF this well is drilled, THEN the assignment shall
be at full force and effect. Thereafter appear the limitations referred to which place a definite time limit upon
the performance of the well drilling. The intent is obvious. Unless the well is drilled, no interest in the fractional oil royalty is to pass or remain in Phebus and
Stock, and it seems perfectly obvious that this instrument
by its terms is self executing. Whether the royalty interest ever passed, and it seems rrwst logical that in fact
it never did pass until the condition wa·s performed, or
whether it did pass under the control limitation of the
condition makes little difference. In either event, no
right, title and interest vested because of the expiration
of the time period since the record is clear that no well
at all was ever drilled upon this ground by Standard Oil
Company or any of its subsidiaries, within the time
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period conteinplated or at all.
At the end of the agreement appears a covenant that
Phebus and Stock agree to reconvey if the test well on
the Ashley Valley "shall not be drilled as herein contemplated." ~~his is in one sense surplusage, and does not
conflict with the clear intent of the parties expressed
above. It is completely logical and consistent, however.
The interest here involved was viewed generally as an
interest in real property, and in fact every instrument
in this record was recorded in the office of the County
Recorder in the same fashion that any standard deed
would be recorded. This rneant that the agreement was
a matter of public record. Whether or not this well was
ever drilled might be a fact within the knowledge of the
parties, but in the event that they late:r: desired to execute a conveyance of their royalty interest there would
remain a factual question which would require clarification on the record, a typical cloud on title. It is entirely
logical that the agreement make provision for such necessity should it ever arise, but it certainly did not alter
and literally change the entire agreement and render the
inclusion of the words IF and THEN meaningless. It
was an ancillary afterthought, and since appellant in
the instant case has never conveyed his interest nor attempted to do so, there has been no particular reason to
demand reconveyance. He did demand a recognition of
his interest, of course, when he discovered in 1948 that
his ownership of the entire 1% royalty was questioned,
and every page of the record of his testimony both subsequent to this time, and later, shows clearly his proper
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conviction that because of the time limit expiration of
the well drilling clause in 1934 he owned the royalty in
its entirety. The clause does not require any affirmative
act on the part of appellant such as demand, and is an
express covenant without qualification to reconvey. Respondents entire position in this controversy is based upon the premise that they are entitled to take advantage
of their own wilful breach of this covenant.
In general, one dominant fact of this agreement is of
particular importance. While it extends to Phebus and
Stock the right to secure permanently the one-third royalty interest by the act of completing the test well within
the time limitations, which was six months after completion of the Rangely well, or early 1934, it does not compel
them to take any action whatsoever in this regard. They
suffer no loss or detriment, and there was no remedy
or right in the grantors in the event the well was not
drilled as agreed. As the cases hereinafter cited point
out, this i'S a typical unilateral agreement and in reality
nothing more than a specie of simple option, wherein the
rights in the optionees Phebus and Stock matured only
in the event they fulfilled the terms of acceptance.
The general rule of construction in oil and gas contracts and agreements is that they are to be construed
strictly against the lessee or grantee and in favor of the
individual making the grant. In some respects the rule
is somewhat different than that applied to ordinary contract because of the highly speculative nature of the property involved. It will be noted moreover, that appellant
did not prepare or cause the agreement to be prepared
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(T. 15), and in fact had not seen it prior to the day of execution, at which tirne other parties had already affixed
their signatures (Exhibit C). The cases indicate that the
agreement should be construed, therefore, liberally in
favor of the appellant.
In Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Guertzgen, 100 F. (2d)
299 (C.C.A. 9) the rule is set forth at page 300:
"Oil and gas leases deal with property of a
highly speculative nature, and the protection of
the interests of the lessor is considered of paramount importance. In Solberg v. Sunburst Oil
Company, 76 Mont. 254, 246 P. 168, it is declared
that (page 172) 'the well-known rules of construction of contracts, have in case of oil and gas leases,
been modified to meet the new conditions arising
by reason of the new industry, and such modification is necessary for the protection of the interests of the landowner and of the public generally.'
The Montana courts have consistently declared
that in connection with such leases frofeitures are
favored by the law. 'Defendants argue that the
courts view forfeitures with disfavor and will enforce thern only when the strict letter of the contract requires it. This is a correct statement of a
general principle of law, but in connection with oil
and gas leases, forfeitures are favored by the law.'
Berthelote et al v. Loy Oil Co., 95 Mont. 434, 28
P. 2d 187, 190. 'It is a recognized doctrine in this
court that oil and gas leases are to be construed
liberally in favor of the lessor and strictly against
the lessee.' McDaniel v. Hager-Stevenson Oil Co.,
75 Mont. 356, 366, 243 P. 582, 586. Other cases
dealing with the gen~ral subject are cited on the
margrn.
"The rule in vogue is not merely to the effect
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that express provisions for forfeiture wi~l he
strictly enforced. An implied right of forfeiture
will be enforced with equal strictness."
In Hill v. Sta.m.olind Oil & Gas Co., 205 P. 2d 643
(Colo.) at page 649:
"Among the rules for construction of a lease
are the following: That it should be construed if
possible so as to give effect to every provision contained in it; that it should be so construed as best
to promote production, development and progress; Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co.,
51 W. Va. 583, 42 S.E. 655, 59 L.R.A. 566; that
it should be construed in favor of the lessor and
against the lessee; that, tv hen cont1·acts are optional in respect to one party, they are strictly
construed in favor of the party that is bound and
against the party that is not bound; Lewis v.
Grininger, 198 Okl. 419, 179 P. 2d 463."

.. Lewis v. Grininger, 179 P. 2d 463 (Okla.) involved
the construction of an oil and ga:s lease and contains an
indication of the practical application of the foregoing
rule of construction. Paragraph five of the lease contained the following provision:
" 'If operations for the drilling of a well for
oil and gas are not commenced on the land hereby
leased on or before Dec. 25, 1942, this lease shall
terminate as to both parties, unless the lessee
shall on or before Dec. 25, 1942, pay or tender to
the lessor * * * the sum of One Hundred Sixty
Dollars which shall operate as a rental and cover
the privilege of deferring the commencement of
drilling operations on the land hereby leased for a
period of twelve months. • • ""'"
Paragraph 15 of the lease was in conflict.
32
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.. 'It is agreed that neglect or failure to pay
rentals when due shall not operate to forfeit or
cancel this lease, until lessor gives lessee notice
by registered mail of said failure to pay rental;
whereupon lessee shall pay same within 10 days
of receipt of said registered letter, or this lease
is void.' "
In holding that the lease had in fact terminated, the
court stated, at page 464:
"Paragraph fifteen is in conflict with paragraph five and indefinite in its terms. It would
extend the lease for a period of at least ten days
beyond the term of twelve months as provided in
paragraph five without payment of any sum to
lessor, and for such further indefinite and uncertain length of time until lessee should receive by
registered mail a notice by lessor of lessee's failure to pay, and then at the option of lessee to expire by its terms unless lessee chose to make payment. This uncertainty and indefiniteness is made
more apparent in the light of the facts in this case.
The lease was made to Sungold Syndicate No.
Two without showing any address of lessee and
the assignment of the lease to defendant was not
filed on record for more than two years after execution of the lease.
"The rules of construction applicable to this
lease are stated in Frank Oil Co. v. Belleview Gas
& Oil Co., et al., 29 Okl. 719, 119 P. 260, 43 L.R.A.,
N.S., 487, where in the third and fourth paragraphs of the syllabus it is said:
'A different rule of construction obtains
as to oil and ga:s leases from that applied to
ordinary leases or to other mining leases.
Owing to the peculiar nature of the mineral,
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and the danger of loss to the· owner from
drainage by surrounding wells, such leases
are construed most st.rongly against the
lessee and in favor of the lessor.

'When contracts are optiorwl ·in respect
to one party they are strictly construed im
favor of the party that is bound and against
the party that is not bound.'
"Under the provisions of paragraph five the
lease had terminated before the provisions of
paragraph fifteen could becon1e operative.
"If paragraph fifteen was effective for any
purpose, it was not effective to prevent termination of the lease under paragraph five above
quoted."
The agreement here involved is substantially what
has been described as the "unless" lease in cases involving oil litigation. The distinguishing characteristic of
such a lease is that the grantee or lessee is under no obligation to affirmatively perform any act whether it be
that of drilling a well or paying rent, it is unilateral in
nature, and essentially a specie of option. Under this
type of agreement, no right vests until there has been a
performance of the condition. This is substantially identical with the agreement here involved, as Phebus and
Stock did not covenant to perform any act either by way
of rental payment or drilling, there was no right in
Preas of any kind to compell them to drill the well on
the Ashley Valley Structure and no remedy if they failed
to do .so.
In Summ.ers Oil and Gas, Permanent Edition, Vol. 2,
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Sec. 452, page 494, appears a summary of the "unless':
lease characteristics, and the distinction between that
lease and an "or' lease which reads as follows:
"'When the "unless" drilling clause is used,
the lessee does not covenant to drill or pay. The
clause relative to the drilling of wells within a
stated time, or the periodic payment of money is
used, not for the purpose of fixing a duty upon
the lessee to drill or pay, but to state a limitation
upon which the lease terminates if these acts are
not perforwed. Consequently, if the lessee fails
to drill within the st,ipulated time, the lessor cannot recover in an action for rent, or recover in an
action for damages for. failure to drill, for the obvious reason that there is no duty on which to
found such actions.
"'Where the "drill or pay" clause is used, the
courts uniformly hold that the interest of the
lessee is subject to be defeated by breach of condition subsequent; that is, the failure of the lessee
to drill or pay within the time or times stipulated
in the lease. This power to forfeit the lease is for
the benefit of and exercisable by the lessor or his
assigns only. Before the lease is terminated by
this power, there must be a declaration of forfeiture by the lessor and a perfection thereof, by reentry, action or other operative act.
" 'But where the "unless" drilling clause is
used, the failure of the lessee to drill or pay a
stipulated sum of money ipso facto terminates the
lease without the necessity of re-entry, action, or
their equivalents by the lessor.' (Citing Gloyd v.
Mid-West Refining Compa,ny, supra.) 'For this
reason the interest created by the lessee by such
lease cannot be one terminable by breach of conditions subsequent. Some courts have designated
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them options or optional leases but the interests
created by them are perhaps b~tter classif~ed as
estates upon common law limitatio~, whereii_l the
interest of the grantee or lessee continues unt~l the
happening of the event upon which they terminate
* * * Some courts have held that the interest ere..
ated by this sort of lease is one on common law
limitation.
"'If the interest created by the "unless" lease
is classed as an interest upon common law or special limitation, it is difficult to see how the termination by failure of the lessee to drill wells or to
pay the sums stipulated therein for the continuance of his privilege of drillings, can be accurately
termed a forfeiture, or a decree of a court of
equity cancelling such a lease or quieting the lessor'·s title in respect to it, th~ enforcement of a
forfeiture. But whether this terminology be finally accepted by the courts to designate the nature
of the interest of the lessee, they nevertheless
agree that the lease autmnatically terminates by
its own terms without the exercise of any power
on the part of the lessor, and this prevents the
interest from being one subject to be defeated by
conditions subsequent, the enforcement of which
is so thoroughly abhorred by courts of equity. It
is no doubt true that, where an "unless" lease has
terminated for the failure of the lessee to drill
test wells or to pay delay rentals within time or
times stipulated, the lessor has a right to have
the cloud thereof removed from his title. * * *'"

Gloyd v. Midwest Refining Co., 62 F. 2d 483 ( C.C.A.
10) defines an unless lease as follows:
"Under an 'or' lease the lessee is obligated
either to drill a well or pay rental and the failure
. ' the lease· and
to pay rental does not terminate

'
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where the lessee makes default in the payment of
rental the lessor may waive the default and recover such rental. ( Citations)
"But under an 'unless' lease the lessee is not
obligated either to cmnmence a well or pay rental.
Until a well has been drilled and oil or gas produced, such a lease is terminable at the will of the
lessee, and where no well has been commenced
such a lease automatically terminates upon the
intentional failure of the lessee to pay the stipulated rental within the time provided in the lease.
(Citations)."

•

"The weight of authority is to the effect that
an 'unless' lease, until the lessee has gone into
possession, drilled a well, and commenced the production of oil or gas from the leased premises, conveys no vested interest in the land itself and is
oni'y an option to go upon the land and explore
for oil and gas. (Citations) But when the lessee
has gone upon the premises, completed a well, and
produced oil or gas therefrom, he then acquires a
vested interest for the term of the lease and becomes bound by all the covenants of the lease, express and implied. (Citations)."

In Bowes v. Republic Oil Company, 252 P. 800
(Mont.), at page 802:
"It is the plain intention of the parties and
not the mere wording of a lease which fixes its
nature as an 'or' lease or an 'unless' lease, as defined in McDaniels v. Hager-Stevenson Oil Co.,
75 Mont. 356, 243 P. 582. In this connection it
must be remembered tha.t such lea.ses as this are
executed for the purpose of having lands explored,
tested, and drilled to determine whether oil and
gas may be found therein, and, therefore, to the
37
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end that development may be promoted and delay:J
therein prevented (New State Oil Co. v. Dunn, 75
Okl. 141, 182 P. 514), they are to b.e constr7!'ed
liberally in favor of the lessor and stnctly agatnst
the lessee. (Citations).

"While forfeitures are not usually favored in
the law, owing to the peculiar nature of oil and
gas leases, forfeitures are here favored rather
than frowned upon. (Citations).
"Reading the lease under consideration in the
light of the foregoing special rules of construction, we are of the opinion that, while it does not
conform to any of the known forn1s of oil and gas
leases and does contain the phrases 'grant, demise,
lease and let' and 'covenant and agree,' it in fact
goes no further than to grant to lessee the privilege of drilling or not drilling at its option andrequires the lessee to do nothing, and, if drilling is
commenced, the lessee is required to prosecute
such operations to completion with diligence. In
all essential features this lease is analogous to the
one under consideration in McDaniels v. HagerStevenson Oil Co., above. It is true that it does
not contain the clause 'unless' the lessee pay
rent, but it does provide that the lease shall be
null and void unless the lessee sees fit to commence operations within the time limit and continue those operations with diligence until gas or
oil is discovered in paying quantities or the required depth is reached, and does not require the
lessee to do either of these things. It falls, then,
within the category of the 'unless' form of lease,
which terminates ipso facto on failure to exercise
the option granted and under which no affirmative
action is required of the lessor. It is therefore im. material that the lessor took no action to declare
38
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a forfeiture before bringing his action, as the lease
automatically e1~pired long prior to the commencement of the action. Solberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas
Co., 76 Mont. 354, 246 P. 168."
The decision in Empire Gas and Fuel Company v.
Sawnders, 22 F. 2d 733 ·( C.C.A. 5) states at page 735:
"The lease under consideration provides that,
if drilling is not begun within one year from its
date, the rights of the lessee shall terminate, unless the lessee keeps it alive by making the payments of rent. It makes time the essence of the
contract. r_rhe lessee is not obligated to do anything, but, if it fails either to drill wells or to make
the payments of rent as and when due, its rights
and privileges are at an end. The lessor was under no duty to notify the lessee of a failure to
pay the correct amount due as rent, and had the
right to remain silent. Under these circumstances,
the lessee could not rely on the lessor's silence."
See also Clovis v. Carson Oil & Gas Co., 11 F. Sup.
797 (D.C.E.D. Mich.); McCrabb v. Moulton, 124 F. 2d
689 (C.C.A. 8); McDaniel v. Hager-Stevenson Oil Co.,
243 P. 582, 585 (Mont.); Guerra v. Chancellor, 103 S.W.
2d 775 (Tex.); Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed.,
Vol.10, Sec. 5570; Williams v. Ware, 31 P. 2d 567 (Okla.),
holding that an unless lease is a unilateral option.
Tlie word "unless" does not actually appear in the
language of this agreement, but the word is defined in
the New Century Dictionary as "if it be not ... that", or
"if ... not." The agreement states, "If the negotiations
... shall result in the drilling ... then this assignment
shall be at full force and effect." The obvious paraphrase
39
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is that the assignment shall not become effective unless
the well is drilled.
As has been detailed above, an oil royalty interest
of the type involved in this litigation is an interest in real
property. In Callahan v. Martin, 43 P. (2d) 788, supra,
the California court turned to the common law for an
analogy upon which to determine the nature of an oil
royalty. We believe such analogy is likewise of assistance
in this case, and that the agreement between Appellant
and Phebus and Stock is a typical illustration of the
common law condition precedent wherein the rights of
grant do not actually arise until such time as there has
been a full compliance with the conditions. In the various constructions of the oil and gas agreements, which
have been set forth above, there are references to this
condition precedent. A definition is found in 12 C. J. 407,
which reads as follows:
"Condition Precedent. (Par. 1) A. In General. One which is to be performed before some
right dependent thereon is performed; one which
must be performed before the interest affected by
it can vest; one that must happen before the estate.
dependent upon it can arise or be enlarged; one
that must happen or be performed before the estate can vest or be enlarged. In contracts, a condition which calls for the perfonnance of some act
or the happening of some event after the terms of
the contract have been agreed upon, before the
contract shall take effect; that is to say, the contract is made in form, but does not become operative as a contract until some future specified act
is performed, or some subsequent event occurs.
It seems to be agreed that in regard to all condi-
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tions whether in a deed or will or in simple contracts, where the condition is in the nature of
a consideration for the concession, its performance will be regarded as in tended to precede the
vesting of any right, and so a condition precedent.
A condition precedent implies an existing fact, or
state of facts, which must be so changed as to
bring it into a condition desired. A condition
which involves anything in the na.ture of a. consideration is, in general, a condition precedent."
We may cite two additional cases which deal in general with the type of agreement of concern and characterize the perfonnance of the drilling as a condition precedent. Thus in Ellison v. Skelly Oil Co., 244 P. (2d) 832,
(Okla.), the Court states at page 836:
"In Gillespie v. Bobo, 271 F. 641, 644, concerning an 'unless' lease there involved, the Federal Fifth Circuit Court said: 'Such instruments
as the one in question have been passed on frequently by the courts of Texas. It is well settled
by the decisions of those courts that such an instrument confers on the so-called lessee a privilege for the specified time, with the option to secure the extension of the privilege for an additional period upon complying with the prescribed
condition, and that time is of the essence of such a
provision as the one above set out. Ford v. Barton (Tex. Civ. App.) 224 S.W. 268; Bailey v. Williams (Tex. Civ. App.) 223 S.W. 311; Young v.
Jones (Tex. Civ. App.) 222 S.W. 691; Ford v.
Cochran (Tex. Civ. App.) 223 S.W. 1041. The
equitable rule as to relieving against forfeiture8
has no application to the case of a failure of a
holder of an option to do, within the time fixed,
what is required to acquire the thing which is the
subject of the option. Equity does not undertake
41
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to dispense with compliance u·,ith what is tna~e a
condition precedent to the acquisition of a nght.
(citing authorities)"
Again in Williams v. Ware, 31 P. (2d) 567, at page
569:
"Quoting from the case of Brennan v. Hunter, 68 Old. 112, 172 P. 49, which is referred to by
this court with approval in the case of Garfield
Oil Company v. Champlin, 78 Old. 91, 189 P. 514,
520, the court said :
"'The lease in the instant case explains fully
the nature and extent of the interest passed to the
lessee; that is, the lessor grants, demises, leases,
and lets unto the lessee for the sole and only purpose of mining and operating for oil and gas and
of laying pipe lines and of building tanks, towers,
stations, and structures thereon to produce, save,
and take care of said products. The lease by its
express terms would terminate unless a well was
completed on the land on or before August 23,
1916. The rental provision granted an option to
the lessee; that is, that by the payJnent of the
rentals the time for completing the well would be
extended another six months. It is immaterial
whether that provision be regarded as an option
to renew the lease, or extend the tern1s, or to continue the lease in force, or defer completion of a
well, or to extend the time for performance of the
condition to cmnplete a well. The payment of the
rerttals specified on or before Augu.st 23, 1916,
was a condition precedent to such renewal extension, or continuance of the lease, or deferring completion, or extension of the ti1ne to perform the
condition to complete a well. When the option
was not exercised, the lease, according to its express terms, terminated on August 23 1916 be42

'

'

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cause no well was completed on or before that
date. The lessee did not agree to pay said sum,
and this cannot be called case of forfeiture incurred for breach of a covenant to pay money, or
any other covenant. Up to the 23rd of August,
1916, the lease was unilateral to this extent: The
lessee could pay or not pay the rentals, and, if he
did not pay, he would not be liable to the lessor
for the same. When the lessee failed to exercise
the option to extend the time, the situation became
the same as though no provision for extending
the time had been in corpora ted in the lease. The
defendant, failing to exercise its option or privilege, its rights are governed solely by the clause
providing that the lease should re1nain in force
for a ter1n of five years from date, and if no well
was completed on said land on or before the 23rd
of August, 1916, the lease would tenninate as to
both parties. It has been held by a long line of
decisions of this court that an "unless" lease, such
as is here involved, is a unilateral option.'"

a

The analogy to the common law condition precedent
is obvious. The language states that IF a well is drilled
in accordance with the specifications of the agreement,
both as to time and the Company to perform the drilling,
"then this assignment shall be at full force and effect
as to the oil royalties hereinafter set forth." This clearly
can mean only that there was no interest which could
vest in Phebus and Stock until this well was drilled as
contemplated. Any other construction necessarily ignores the plain language of the agreement and the obvious intent of the parties in this regard. The language
ties directly with the common law definition of a condition precedent, which is simply a condition to be per43
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formed before a right dependent thereon is acquired, ot
the estate dependent upon it can arise or be enlarged.
A further test of the intent of the parties is found in the
fact that at no time has Appellant acquired any right of
action whatsoever for damages or injury in the event the
well was not drilled. This is a typical condition precedent
as conceived by the con1mon law, and under such conception failure to perform the condition has the effect of preventing any interest from vesting. This is obviously what
transpired in the instant case.
C. Claim based on agreement has been abandoned.
As the above citations have indicated, the Courts
have uniformly expressed a concern with the necessity
of so construing oil agreements as to expedite drilling
and development of the resources of the various states.
The agreement contemplates two wells, one on the
Rangely structure, and the other on this property on the
Ashley Valley structure. The first, and Rangely deep
test well, was completed on July 31, 1933, and the time
limitations of Exhibit C required the commencement of
drilling on the Ashley Valley structure on January 31,
1934. This well was not drilled. The agreements which
had been executed with Standard Oil and its subsidiary,
The California Company, were by the latter reassigned
on March 21, 1943, (Exhibit H), with a recital that the
California Company "had elected not to commence the
drilling of a test well on the Ashley 'Talley structure."
From that date, for year after year, the land was vacant
and there was no oil drilling of any kind by any Company
until the year 1948, when Equity Oil Company spudded
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in its well. '_rhis is a period of fourteen years, which is
scarcely the activity contemplated, and for which these
royalty holders were willing to relinquish one-third of
their royalties. The background compels the conclusion
that time was of the essence. Gas was being produced in
1930 and oil had been discovered on the premises prior
to that time according to the testimony of appellant. This
simply means that although there had never been commercial production of oil, there was every indication to
believe that oil would in fact be found. To secure that development within a relatively short period of time appellant was willing to forego a one-third royalty, and there
is no other premise upon which there is any explanation
for the meticulous detail of the condition which was inserted in this agreement.
The conclusion is obvious and the fact of abandonment clear from this record. Not only did Phebus and
Stock fail to perform the condition set forth in the agreement, but both themselves and the other respondents
herein knew that such condition had not been performed.
The agreement was abandoned in its entirety following
.January, 1934.
Abandonment is well known in oil and gas law. As
the Court stated in Rehard v. Klossner, 119 P. (2d) 145,
pages 147, 148:
"The trial court found that there had been no
drilling on the leased lands for more than two
years and that defendant had failed to pay the
rentals. Tliese findings show an abandonment of
the lease and the leased property sufficient to support the judgment.
45
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"In the case of Hall v. Augur, 82 Cal. App. :19-!,
256 P. 232, 234, the oil lease in question there was
dated May 5 1921 and became effective not later
than May 30,' 1921.' rrhere was no forfei~ure ~lause
in the lease. The suit to quiet title agarnst rt was
filed on May 22, 1922, as no drilling operations
had been started. In holding that there had been
an abandonment, the court said:
"'Abandonment will be more readily found in
the case of oil and gas leases than in most other
cases. In Harris v. Riggs, 63 Ind. App. 201, 112
N.E. 36, it is said: "Such a lease may be abandoned, and when once abandoned by the lessee,
he cannot thereafter claim or enforce any right
thereunder without first securing the consent of
the lessor or a renewal of the lease. (Citing authorities)
"'"It has been held and supported by sound
reason that abandonment may be rnore readily
found in cases of oil and gas leases than in most
other instances. The rights granted under such
leases are for exploration and development. The
title or interest granted is inchoate until oil or gas
is found in quantities warranting operation, and
courts will not permit the lessee to fail in development and hold the lease for speculative or other
purposes, except in strict compliance with his
contract for a valuable and sufficient consideration other than such development. (Citing author·
ities)"
" 'We believe the evidence was sufficient to
support the finding of fact by the trial court that
the defendants abandoned whatever right title,
or interest they or either of them, had in ~nd to
such lease prior to the assignment of said lease
to the Interstate Oil Corporation.' (Citations)"
46
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D. The statute of limitations did not constitute a defense, because such statute does not apply to an
action in the nature of quiet title to remove a cloud,
and the action could not in any event arise until
Nov-ember, 1948, one year and six months prior to
time action was commenced on May 16, 1950.
In the first place, the Court has misconstrued the
clear intent of the parties as expressed in Exhibit C. As
we have pointed out in detail above, no right was vested
in Phebus or Stock until such time as they had performed
this condition, and since it was never performed, no right
under this Exhibit ever matured. None of the affirmative defenses asserted by respondents have any application, and this is true of the one defense upon which the
Trial Court apparently based its decision, which was the
statute of lirnitations.
Paragraph 3 of the Conclusions of Law, (R. 41),
states that appellant's cause of action accrued on or about
January 1, 1934, which was six months after the completion of the deep test well on the Rangely structure in
Colorado, which had been completed on July 1, 1933.
Paragraph 4 of such Conclusions, (R. 41), then goes
on to find that the action is one upon a contract or obligation founded upon an instrument in writing, and was,
therefore, barred within six years from the date of the
accrual of the cause of action under the provisions of
the Utah statute of limitations set forth in Title 78, Chapter 12, Section 23, subsection 2. In these Conclusions of
Law it is apparent that the Trial Court has not only misconstrued the essential nature of this action, which is to
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remove a cloud and quiet title, but it has likewise failed
to properly establish the time at which a cause of action
arose.
This action did not arise, and appellant was notrequired to take any affirmative action, until such time as
he was aware that an adverse claim existed. It is clear
from the record that appellant had no conception of the
fact that there was a claim to his one-third of one percent
royalty interest until he first saw the endorsement on
the royalty check received from Equity Oil Company in
November, 1948. His actions are consistent wth such be.
lief, and, in fact, at this time he was not sure that such a
claim existed, but felt the necessity of attempting to determine such fact because of the unusual wording of the
endorsement on the royalty check. He immediately attempted to contact Stock, discussed the matter with Phebus and finally wrote a letter to Stock requesting clarification and a determination as to whether or not, in fact,
there was an adverse claim. Prior to the receipt of such
check from Equity Oil Company his entire conduct indicated that he had no idea of any claim existing after the
year 1934 and the failure of performance of the condition contained in Exhibit C.
The Court, moreover, has failed to properly analyze
the action as one to remove cloud and quiet title. In such
event, the statute of limitations does not apply as the
cloud is deemed to exist at all times until it is, in fact,
removed either by voluntary action of a party or court
decree. In this connection we should point out that all of
the cases hereinabove cited which analyze and deal wit~
48
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the "unless" type of agreement are basically actions to
quiet title.
In the case of Hudson v. Smith, 41 P. (2d) 861,
(Okla.), the court states :
"We know of no statute in this state that bars
the plaintiff's action. The defendants claim that
since the deed was executed in 1919, and suit not
commenced until 1933, the action is barred. The
statute could not commence to run until plaintiff
became aware of a hostile claim, or a disptde as
to his interest. The petition alleges that no hostile claim arose until less than one year prior to
the commencement of the action. The plaintiff's
right to an equitable adjudication of his title was
a continuing one, and no statute of limitations
could commence running until an adverse cla.im
arose. Robertson v. Battles, 97 Okl. 54, 221 P.
1002." (page 864)
In Luker v. Anderson, 10 S.W. (2d) 149, the Court
stated at page 150:
"The contention of appellant that appellee's
cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations must be overruled. The injury from a cloud
on title is continuing, and the cause of action for
its removal is likewise continuing and never barred while the cloud exists. Texas Co. v. Davis,
113 Tex. 321, 254 S.W. 304, 255 S.W. 601."
See 17 R.C.L. 715, paragraph 71, page 715:
"Action to quiet title -A cloud upon a title
is considered as continuing to operate during the
period of its existence and, therefore, the right
to maintain an action to remove a cloud from a
title is a continuing one to which the statute of
limitations is not applicable."
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Skelly Oil Co. v. Wickham, 202 F. (:2d) -±42
C.C.A.lO);
Superior Oil Co. v. Jackson, 250 P. (2d) 23
(Okla.);
Mark v. Bradford, 23 N.W. (2d) 205, (Mich.)
In this connection also we direct the. Court's at.
tention to paragraph 2 of the Conclusions of Law, (R.
41), wherein the Court holds that plaintiff's action, jj
any, is in personam, and apparently ties this to its con.
elusion relative to the statute of limitations. What haE
been said above would apply both to an action in per.
sonam or an action in rem. We believe, however, that
this is a fun damen tal error on the part of the Court.
This would seem to imply that the Court viewed the conditions and limitations of Exhibit C as a specie of covenant rather than as a condition. A covenant is well known
in law, and must necessarily involve an agreement to do
or refrain from doing an act. A condition, on the other
hand, is simply an event which may occur and as the result of which a legal right is lost or acquired. Under
Exhibit C there was no requirement that Preas or Phebus
drill or not drill. They were free to do as they desired,
and clearly this is not a covenant. On the other hand, it is
a typical condition, in that if Standard Oil Company,
or its subsidiary, drilled a well on the property within the
· limited time specified, then and only then respondents
would have acquired the right in question.
POINT III. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
MAKING AND ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT, THE
SAME BEING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND STIPU.
LATED FACTS.
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Two particular Findings of Fact indicate that the
Court has misconstrued the evidence. Paragraph 4 of
such Findings, ( R. 39), reads as follows :
"That on October 11, 1930 the plaintiff, for
a valuable consideration, assigned, conveyed and
set over unto the defendants Paul Stock and Ray
Phebus one-third of all his right, title and interest
in and to said oil royalty interest, except as the
same pertains to the NElJt of the SE1;4 of said
Section 15, with the express understanding and
agreement that the said Stock and Phebus would
reconvey the royalty interest so assigned to them
in the event that Stock and Phebus did not procure the drilling of a test well on the above described property, the so-called Ashley Valley
structure, by the Standard Oil Company of California, or by some other operator, within six
months after the completion of a deep test well
to be first drilled, but not later than the summer
of 1931, on the Rangely structure in Northwestern
Colorado, all as provided by the written assignment, copy of which is attached to plaintiff's
amended complaint as Exhibit 'C'."

It is apparent fron1 this Finding that the Trial Judge
has misconstrued Exhibit C and the resulting effect of
the failure of performance of the conditions contained
therein. It recites that this instrument was made for a
valuable consideration, whereas, in fact, the only consideration is the actual drilling of a well as contemplated
by the agreement, and the Finding fails to recognize
that the instrument in question is in net effect unilateral
and nothing more than an option, as has been pointed
out hereinbefore.
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Finding of Fact No. 6 reads as follows: (R. 40)
"That by mesne conveyances and assignment
the defendants Paul Stock, .Joe rr. Juhan am
Weber Oil Company have succeeded to and ar,
now the record holders and owners of said one
third of one percent oil royalty interest."
It is obvious that since no rights vested under Ex
hibit C there never existed any basis upon which Phebu
or Stock could have later made effective conveyances t~
the present respondents. It is interesting to note tha
there is no instrument subsequent to the time of their fail
ure to perform the condition of well drilling in January
1934, which makes any specific reference to Exhibit C
The importance of these Findings lies in the fact tha
they show clearly the basic error of the Trial Judge iJ
analyzing Exhibit C, and are factual findings upon whicJ
the two Conclusions of Law considered above have pre
sumably been based.
POINT IV. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED H
REFUSING APPELLANT'S TENDER OF PROOF THA~
APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE $1.00, WITH REFERENCl
TO THE EXECUTION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEE~
APPELLANT AND PHEBUS AND STOCK, FROM WHICI
ANY RIGHT OF RESPONDENTS MUST ORIGINATE.

At page 16 of the Transcript (R. 45), appellant, witl
reference to whether or not he had received the $1.01
referred to in the first paragraph of the body of Exhibi
C, made tender of fact as follows:
"And in connection with that, I would like t
make a formal tender of proof in the record tha
Mr. Preas was in the court room and would ar
swer and testify that in fact he did not receive th
$1.00."
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It is perfectly obvious that this fact has a direct
bearing on the issues of this case. One of the keys· to a
determination of such issues lies in establishing the intent of the parties to this agreement. The fact that this
sum was never paid is a strong indication that none of
the parties viewed it as having any relation to the real
consideration of the agreement, and the tender is clearly
relevant to this point and should have been admitted in
evidence.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion appellant asserts that the judgment of
the Trial Court is in error as it fails to recognize that
any right of respondents in and to the one-third of one
per cent oil royalty must necessarily arise from Exhibit
C, and no rights in respondents could have vested under
such Exhibit until there had been a performance of conditions set forth therein. Such performance was precedent
to any such right, and when Phebus and Stock failed to
perform such conditions within the time limitation set
forth, expiring in January, 1934, their right, title and
interest to any claim under this agreement had expired.
Thereafter appellant was not required to take any affirmative action of any kind, nor to demand a re-conveyance from Phebus and Stock. F'urther, that the statute
of limitations which forms the basis of the Trial Court's
judgment is not applicable because such statute does not
apply to this action which is a quiet title action to remove a cloud, and because, in any event, no adverse
claim arose until the year 1948, which was less than two
years from the date of commencement of the instant case.
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Appellant, therefore, respectfully prays that the
judgment of the Trial Court be reversed and a decree
entered establishing appellant's right and title in and to
the one-third of one per cent royalty here involved, and
requiring respondent Equity Oil Company to forthwith
pay to appellant royalty proceeds based upon such
one-third of one per cent interest from November, 1948,
to date hereof.
Respectfully submitted,
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY,
&SNOW
Attorneys for Appellarnt.

54

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

